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Summary 
The study of think tanks brings together a range of academic disciplines and allows for multi-
facetted analyses, encompassing the concepts of ideas, institutions, influence, interests, and 
power. The literature on think tanks addresses a ubiquitous policy actor. Think tanks have been 
around for a long time, especially in advanced liberal democracies but have also established in 
authoritarian regimes and in the developing world. Nowhere is their influence on policy-
making or the public debate easy to pinpoint.  
Definitions of think tank have been contested ever since the study of think tanks took off in the 
1980s and 1990s. Some scholars have devised typologies around organisational form and 
output with a focus on whether think tanks are openly partisan or rather emphasise their 
political and ideological neutrality; others propose that the think tank is not so much a clearly 
discernible organisational entity but rather a set of activities which can be conducted by a broad 
range of organisations; others again see think tanks as hybrid boundary organisations operating 
at the interstices of different societal fields. What most scholars will agree on is that policy 
expertise is think tanks’ main output, that they seek to influence policy-makers and the wider 
public, and that they try to do so via informal and formal channels and by making use of their 
well-connected position in often transnational policy networks encompassing political parties, 
interest groups, corporations, international organisations, civil society organisations, and civil 
service bureaucracies.  
Such policy expertise – in the form of concrete proposals or ‘blue-skies thinking’ – is 
underpinned by claims that it is ‘evidence-based’. The positivist notion of ‘evidence-based 
policy-making’ has been of benefit to think tanks as organisations which claim to ‘speak truth 
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to power’ and produce easily digestible outputs aimed policy-makers who profess to want 
evidence to make policy ‘that works’.  
Think tanks are active at different ‘moments’ in the policy-making process John Kingdon’s 
agenda-setting theory of the multiple streams framework helps understand think tanks as 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ who are most likely to have influence during the moments of problem 
framing, the  search for policy solutions, and the promotion of specific solutions to policy-
makers and public.  
Think tank studies should take into account the relationship between media and think tanks, 
and how this relationship impacts on whether think tanks succeed in agenda-setting and, 
thereby, influence policy-making. The relationship is symbiotic: journalists use think tanks to 
inform their work or welcome their contribution in the form of an opinion piece, while think 
tanks use the media to air their ideas . This relationship is not one without problems, as some 
think tanks are in privileged positions with regards to media access while others barely ever 
cross the media threshold.  
Think tanks are, in the 21st century, challenged by an ‘epistemic crisis’. This crisis consists of 
a loss of faith in experts and of information pollution and information overload. This 
development is both risk and opportunity for think tanks. Concerning the latter, policy-makers 
increasingly need curators, arbiters or filters to help them decide which information, data, and 
policy expertise to use in their decision-making processes.  
 
Keywords: Think tanks; policy-making; ideas; expertise; epistemic crisis; evidence-based 
policy-making 
 
Introduction  
3 
 
Think tanks have become, in many polities, ubiquitous organisations – through their presence 
in the print and electronic media, but also through their contributions to governmental 
commissions, parliamentary committees or public deliberations. Their ubiquity has not made 
it easier for the analyst to pin them down with definitions or typologies which capture precisely 
their role and relevance in the policy process. Sometimes it is easy to identify an organisation 
as a think tank not so much because it calls itself a ‘think tank’ or because it takes an easily 
recognisable organisational form, but because of what it does and how. In other cases, the think 
tank label is used as a cachet suggesting impartiality and objectivity of expertise to cover up 
what really amounts to lobbying activities on behalf of party political or corporate interest (e.g. 
Hawkins 2014; Carter 2014).  
What the ubiquity – and, as will be discussed later, the growing number globally – of think 
tanks suggests is that think tanks and their products are in demand. In the forms of ‘blue skies 
thinking’ or concrete policy proposals, policy expertise is, followed by strategic and tactical 
advice and public advocacy, the core product of the think tank. The relationship between policy 
expertise and policy-making is complex and has, over the past decades, undergone several 
transformations which have also impacted on think tanks and their standing amongst the many 
actors involved in policy-making processes. There is, for example, the changing nature and 
increasing diversity of the sources of expertise from which governments can draw. Besides the 
traditional source of policy advice, the civil service, the 21st century sees   a competitive and 
fragmented mixed economy of think tanks, for-profit consultancies, research institutes, and 
lobby firms. Concurrent with these trends, many governments have, over decades, lost ‘in-
house’ experts and have come to increasingly rely on knowledge production by this diverse 
and multi-logic cosmos of outside stakeholders, many of them operating also on the 
transnational level. These and further developments, some of which are discussed later, have 
expedited the emergence of fluid, fragmented and transnational constellations of relationships 
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between policy-making and expertise. No doubt, these new constellations have had 
implications for how policy is made vis-à-vis e.g. the inclusion and exclusion of certain actors 
and their views; the quality, content and outcomes of policy; and the likelihood of policy 
change. This ‘bigger picture’ is important to bear on mind when the think tank is discussed and 
when empirical research is conducted on think tanks’ roles in specific policy processes.  
The analysis of the roles of think tanks in the policy process raises many questions, but those 
on power and influence are perhaps most salient: Are think tanks potentially most influential 
as agenda-setters? Or are they at their best when it comes to policy analysis and policy 
formulation? Do think tanks also influence policy implementation and policy evaluation? The 
difficulties – methodological, empirical and theoretical – associated with attempts to answer 
these questions are not unique to think tanks. However, fully grasping the role of think tanks 
in the policy process could be more complex and more riddled with obstacles than 
understanding the roles of other policy actors such as lobbying firms, political parties, 
businesses, civil service, media, academia, and campaigning organisations. Certainly, none of 
these difficulties have meant that think tanks have escaped academic scrutiny – and, indeed, 
the scrutiny of investigative journalists, ‘fact checkers’ or ‘spin watchers’ interested in the 
wheeling and dealing of politics and how think tanks may be intertwined with elected 
politicians, civil servants, representatives of labour and capital, philanthropic donors, and the 
many civil society organisations in plural societies. Nor should they, given that think tanks are 
a growing global phenomenon, are credited with power and influence and sometimes criticised 
over the democratic legitimacy of their activities specifically in the light of think tanks’ 
relationships to so many societal actors  
It is also important to note that the study of think tanks and their roles usefully brings together 
a number of academic disciplines. Public policy studies, political sciences, sociology, and 
media studies can be named. For this reason, the study of think tanks is a potentially very 
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rewarding field for the multi-disciplinary social scientist. This is even more so because, given 
the position of think tanks vis-à-vis the media, business, politics, and academia, the study of 
think tanks allows the analyst to conduct multi-facetted work that encompasses the study of 
ideas, institutions, influence, interests, and power.  
Those interested in think tanks have a significant body of literature to choose from, covering 
not only the anglophone world – were think tank studies started – but also other parts of the 
developing and developed world. The first studies of think tanks were mainly single country 
case studies (e.g. Abelson and Carberry 1997; Beloff, 1977; Blackstone & Plowden, 1988; 
Cockett, 1995; Desai, 1994; Goodwin & Nacht, 1995; Quigley, 1997; Stone, 1996; Struyk, 
1999; Weiss, 1992). Later literature has addressed the think tank through comparative 
perspectives with an interest in, for example, whether parliamentarian or presidential 
democracies spur different think tank landscapes and how differing ‘access points’ for think 
tanks to formal decision-making processes may impact on think tank influence (e.g. Pautz 
2012; Braml 2006). In the second decade of the 21th century,  the think tank and its role in the 
policy process has come to be looked at from a transnational vantage point, with the literature 
taking into account that ideas travel, and making the point that think tank networks span nation 
state borders (e.g. Plehwe 2018; Stone 2013; Fischer & Plehwe 2017). Supporting the point 
that the think tank is a global phenomenon is James McGann’s GoTo Global Think Tank Index. 
While one may argue with its methodology of evaluating and ranking think tank influence and 
quality of their output (e.g. Köllner 2013), the indexes have shown, since 2008, that the think 
tank exists nearly everywhere – in 2017/18, just under 8000 organisations were listed  (McGann 
2018). A good part of the think tank growth has occurred in BRIC countries. That means that 
even under authoritarian regimes the think tank has prospered – according to McGann 
(McGann 2018), China boasts the second most populous think tank landscape (e.g. Tanner 
2002; Zhu 2013, Köllner et al 2018) – and that policy-makers, publics and funders in 
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developing countries see a need and have a purpose for policy expertise as it is produced, in its 
specific form, by think tanks (e.g. Ladi et el 2018; Young 2005).  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, an account of different definitions of the think tank 
will be given. Second, the notion of ‘evidence-based policy-making’ and how think tanks 
engage with it will be critically discussed. Third, a specific conceptual framework borrowed 
from agenda-setting studies to help locate think tanks in the policy process will be proposed. 
Fourth, the importance of the news media for think tanks is discussed. Fifth, a discussion of 
several crises, in particular an ‘epistemic crisis’, and how they have affected the think tank will 
conclude the main part of the chapter. A short conclusion will round off the chapter which, in 
toto, should give the reader an overview of the role of think tanks in the policy process, what 
of this involvement should be seen critically, and also how academic research has approached 
the think tank methodologically. Some sections of this chapter are quite country-specific, 
others speak more generally about the phenomenon. All of them build on the rich existing 
academic literature.  
 
Defining the Think Tank is a Complex Task  
This section discusses three main ways of defining the think tank – each of which considers, in 
one way or the other, forms, functions and activities of think tanks and the relationships 
between think tank and other policy actors.  
Amongst the earliest and most influential definitions of the think tank is that proposed by Kent 
Weaver and James McGann. They understand think tanks as ‘non-governmental, not-for-profit 
research organisations with substantial organisational autonomy from government and from 
societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties’ (Weaver & McGann, 
2000, 4). Beyond this definition with its focus on organisational form and relationship to other 
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policy actors, they have also provided the think tank scholar with a threefold typology outlined 
later in this section. A more recent definition of the think tank has proposed o understanding 
through the lens of ‘function’ rather than through that of ‘form’. The argument is that think 
tanks may not have distinct organisational features but are characterised by a certain range of 
activities specific to think tanks (Pautz, 2011). In this sense, that ‘what passes under the heading 
“think tank” is best understood as a device for gathering and assembling forms of authority’ 
(Shaw et al 2015, 59). The emphasis on activities rather than organisational form takes into 
account two factors. First, the boundaries between organisations such as university institutes, 
think tanks and consultancies and their forms of knowledge production and dissemination have 
become increasingly blurred (Kipping & Engwall, 2002; Weingart, 2005). Second, the ‘export’ 
of think tanks to beyond the Western liberal democratic world has led to the emergence of 
hybrid forms which resist the traditional conﬂation of function with a speciﬁc organisational 
format (Stone, 2013). This  alternative view of the think tanks as a set of activities rather than 
as a specific organisational ‘thing’ has emerged alongside a third view on what think tanks are. 
Seeing them as sui generis organisations, it is proposed that they operate in an ‘institutional 
subspace located at the crossroads of the academic, political, economic, and media spheres’. 
As boundary organisations think tanks work across and with players from these other spheres 
and, importantly, draw their own legitimacy from these other spheres. Importantly, from their 
position in the ‘space of think tanks’ they regulate ‘the circulation of knowledge and personnel’ 
among the other spheres (Medvetz, 2012, 7) and thereby exert influence. 
The academic debate about think tank definitions is as old as the field of think tank studies, 
and new or refined ways of defining them may still emerge. But these debates should consider 
that too rigid understandings of whether an organisation is a think tanks or not may not be 
helpful vis-à-vis understanding the functioning of complex and dynamic ‘policy advisory 
systems’ (Halligan 1995) of which think tanks are part. This is demonstrated by empirical 
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research on the role of think tanks during and after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008. 
Carola Westermeier, for example, has discussed the Bank of International Settlement as a think 
tank because of its activities and functions in the making of a new macroprudential regulation 
regime after the crisis. In order to facilitate a push for policy solutions which would set the 
standards for banking supervision worldwide, the ‘Bank of Banks’ undertook the activities 
considered to be those of the think tank – it produced ideas and policy proposals and brought 
different policy actors together to form a consensus view on the basis of the authority of its 
expertise (Westermeier, 2018). This raises the issue of typologies and how they risk limiting 
our understanding of think tanks and their role in the policy process. To this day, one of the 
most influential typologies of think tanks is that developed by Kent Weaver (e.g. Weaver 
1989). This typology has been adapted, over the years, to other country-specific contexts (see 
Císař & Hrubeš, 2016; Gellner, 1995; Haughton & Allmendinger, 2016) and remains popular 
so that it deserves a more detailed outline. For Weaver, the first type, labelled ‘universities 
without students’ or ‘academic think-tank’, is characterized by a stress on objectivity and non-
partisanship. Secondly, there is the ‘contract research organisation’ which is mostly 
commissioned by government departments. These organisations portray themselves as 
technocratic and non-partisan. Thirdly, the ‘advocacy think-tank’ has a strong ideological bent 
and actively seeks to influence policy debates.  
While this typology has been widely used, its consequences on think tank research have not 
been necessarily only positive. It has contributed to a view that policy expertise can be either 
‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ or ‘partisan’ and ‘ideological’. This is problematic because such an 
understanding of knowledge overlooks that it cannot be ‘disinterested, that policy is 
constructed in an environment of shared language and practice and that policy analysis is a 
moral activity’ (Shaw et al 2015, 61). This point will be scrutinised in more depth in the next 
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section, when the discussion will turn to the topic of how think tanks have prospered in an age 
of ‘evidence-based policy-making’.  
 
Think Tanks and ‘Evidence-Based Policy-Making’ 
Evidence-based policy-making became a buzzword in the late 1990s (Packwood, 2002). In the 
United Kingdom, the ‘modernisers’ of the incoming ‘New Labour’ government (Sanderson, 
2003; Pawson, 2006) pronounced that policy-making should no longer be steered by ideology 
or partisan interests, but simply and plainly by high-quality evidence showing ‘what works’ 
(Cairney, 2017). This arguably boosted the role of non-governmental expert organisations 
tasked with the design and evaluation of policy. However, evidence-based policy-making has 
become something of a mantra, and questions have been raised about whether governments 
have really become more interested in expertise or whether the emphasis on expertise is not 
rather part of the ‘performance’ of government to ‘demonstrate that action has been taken’ 
rather than being ‘the determinant of action’ (Colebatch, 2018, 370). An analysis of think tank 
involvement in German labour market reform debates in the late 1990s and early 2000s could 
be instructive here. A specific think tank, the Bertelsmann Foundation, was implanted by 
government into the tripartite discussions between trade unions, employers and government on 
how to deal with high unemployment. The aim was to ‘sober up’ the debate, as one think tank 
staffer described their government-prescribed task in the process (Pautz 2012, 123; Pautz, 
2008). This was meant to be achieved via ‘benchmarking’, the results of which can be put 
‘forward as politically neutral truths’ (Robertson, 1991, 55), with the aim to present what were 
quintessentially neoliberal labour market reforms as the ‘only game in town’ and refutable 
only, according to the defenders of evidence-based policy-making, on the basis of dogmatic 
ideology or pure self-interest. In other words, evidence-based policy-making was used to 
neutralise in particular the trade unions and a think tank helped doing so.  
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What is also problematic about the notion of evidence-based policy-making is that the idea of 
establishing ‘what works’ on the basis of ‘evidence’ is underpinned by positivist and rationalist 
assumptions about the world (e.g. Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009; Sanderson, 2003; Fischer, 
2002). Greenhalgh and Russel refer to these assumptions as ‘naïve’ because they misconstrue 
how policy is made by ignoring the fact that values and ethics – for example, those of the 
researcher or the funding agency – are always implicated in the phenomenon studied 
(Greenhalgh & Russel, 2009, 306). The positivism that underlies the idea of evidence-based 
policy-making is problematic also because it suggests that a phenomenon can be fully and 
objectively understood if only enough research is conducted. However, there ‘is no such thing 
as “the body of evidence”. There are simply (more or less) competing (re)constructions of 
evidence to support almost any position’ (Wood et al 1998, 1735). Such assumptions, as 
demonstrated in the example of German labour market reform, also result in the de-
politicisation of policy-making as enough evidence is assumed to determine unproblematic 
‘correct’ courses of action for which ethical or moral questions are hardly relevant and for 
which public democratic debate about society’s preferences is no longer necessary.  
While the reality of the policy process is messier than the discourse on evidence-based policy-
making suggests – and interpretivist and critical research on policy-making has shown that the 
‘romantic stories of “evidence-based policymaking” in which we expect policymakers to 
produce “rational” decisions in a policy cycle with predictable, linear stages’ (Cairney 2018, 
200) are a fallacy – its attractiveness to policy-makers and politicians has played into the hands 
of think tanks. Positivist rationalism may be ‘naïve’, but think tanks are not. Presenting 
themselves as ‘above the political fray’ and as organisations with ‘a view from nowhere’ (Shaw 
et al 2015), many think tanks have happily subscribed to the understanding of ‘policymaking 
as getting [research] evidence into practice’ (Greenhalgh & Russell 2009, 310), and claim that 
their policy proposals are not tarred by the ideological preconceptions of elected politicians or 
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by lobby groups’ narrow interests as they are based on evidence and nothing else. However, 
whether think tanks always succeed to be perceived as objective and neutral agents is another 
question. Doberstein has shown, in experimental research, that even those policy-makers who 
profess a belief in evidence-based policy-making may not hold think tank output in the highest 
regard as they consider it substantially less credible and more ideological than, for example, 
academic output (Doberstein, 2018). In this context it is of note that some research suggests 
that while think tanks employ a language of objectivity and impartiality when they face the 
public, they use a more value-intensive language when dealing with decision-makers ‘behind 
the scenes’ (Shaw et al, 2015, 73). It is also of relevance to recognise how critical academic 
research offers insights into this problem when it finds think tanks taking part in ‘policy-based 
evidence-making’. The most publicised instances revolve around cases where think tanks have 
been able to speak as authoritative voices, on the basis of their ‘knowledge’ and expertise, on 
matters such as alcohol minimum pricing (Hawkins & McCambridge, 2014), tobacco use and 
advertisement (Miller & Harkins, 2010; Smith et al 2016), and climate change. The latter will 
be discussed in some more detail later. In all cases think tanks have been found to act as 
‘merchants of doubt’ (Cann & Raymond, 2018; Miller & Dinan, 2015) by producing reports in 
which they misrepresent existing research or in which they omit crucial findings when they go 
contrary to the expectations and interests of their funders. 
Less obviously related to ‘policy-based evidence-making’ but of relevance in this context 
nonetheless is critical scrutiny of how think tanks engage in the stabilisation of wider policy 
agendas or even world views against severe criticism from other corners of society. Neo-
liberalism and its corollary ‘austerity’ are an example here and one that is pertinent to many 
countries in the second decade of the 21st century. Research has shown (e.g. Plehwe et al, 2018) 
how a transnational network of think tanks, in Europe after the Global Financial Crisis and 
during the ensuing economic crisis after 2008, has uncompromisingly defended the ‘dangerous 
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idea’ (Blyth, 2013) of austerity. The researchers used social network analysis to show how 
think tank networks such as the Mont Pelerin Society, the Atlas Network or the Stockholm 
Network have successfully contributed to the stabilisation and strengthening of neo-liberalism 
and austerity, for example in Germany – a country at the forefront of austerity in Europe, and 
a country in which anti-austerity ideas have been particularly unsuccessful, for example in 
terms of passing the media threshold, not just since the crisis. This helped to reduce any 
likelihood of ‘paradigmatic change’, away from austerity and neo-liberalism, despite the 
existing and widespread criticism, before and since the crises, of austerity, neoliberal trickle-
down economics, and lax financial regulations. Research on how think tanks built a discursive 
‘firewall’ to support the British Conservative Party’s evolving austerity agenda after 2009 
shows how think tanks’ far-reaching and even radical proposals on how public spending should 
be reduced helped the Conservative Party – soon to be in government after the 2010 elections 
– to present its own austerity plans not only as comparatively moderate but also as 
unideological (Pautz, 2018). Such analysis constitutes be one important element in the analysis 
of the ‘strange non-death of neo-liberalism’ (Crouch, 2011; Hay & Smith, 2013; Schmidt & 
Thatcher, 2013).  
This critique, however, is not supposed to dismiss think tanks as mere agents of an interested 
elite wielding illegitimate influence over public policy, or to say that think tanks are 
manipulating policy-makers, media and citizens. It certainly is not a call for policy-making 
without research evidence.  However, those who want to conduct research on think tanks – and, 
even more importantly, the users of think tanks’ research outputs – must bear on mind that not 
only is the production of evidence influenced by the existing belief systems of those involved 
in its making, but also that the ways policy-makers accept evidence, knowledge and 
information into policy design is strongly pre-conditioned by their ‘ideological preferences’ 
(Packwood, 2002) or ‘ideational prisms’ (Fischer, 2003, 22). Furthermore, it is important to 
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highlight that success and failure of policy ideas or broader world views depend – to some 
degree, at least – on the material foundations that limit or facilitate their production and 
dissemination. In other words, well-resourced, well-staffed and well-networked think tanks are 
more likely to succeed in influencing the policy process than, for example, a disparate set of 
civil society organisations using knowledge claims based on ‘lived experience’ rather than on 
‘research evidence’. Subsequently, claims made in some early think tank literature, from a 
pluralist perspective, on the competition of ideas on a ‘market place’ where the best ideas win 
should be treated carefully and concerns about the legitimacy of think tank influence be taken 
seriously.  
The next section will look at how, where, and when think tanks get involved in policy-making 
and at which point in the policy process they may be at their most influential.  
 
Think Tanks in the Policy Process  
Research which seeks to establish whether think tanks have influenced a government’s policy 
agenda starts from the apriori assumption that ideas matter, both in ‘everyday politics’ and in 
moments of crisis (Blyth, 2010). The growing and diversifying think tank landscape across the 
world is itself testament to this belief – shared by funders and others involved in think tanks – 
that ideas have a role to play in politics. In this sense the literature on think tanks, but also think 
tanks and their funders themselves, have accepted the propositions of the ‘ideational turn’ 
(Blyth, 1997) and its rejection of purely rationalistic or materialistic approaches to explaining 
policy change and continuity. 
The theme of ‘influence’ is, understandably, a dominant feature in the literature on think tanks. 
After all, think tanks claim to be about influencing policy and some indeed make grand claims 
in this regard, while others are reluctant to talk about their relationships to elites from 
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government, civil service, political parties, business or the trade unions and are guarded when 
it comes to their own power in these relationships and networks. Think tank researchers often 
investigate into this complex problem through questions on how far any influence exists and 
whether it is democratically legitimate, whether it is likely to be stronger at certain moments 
in the policy process and whether it can be measured. Beyond empirical case studies of think 
tank influence on specific policies, some research has attempted to make broader points about 
if, how, and when think tanks have influence. For example, some see think tanks as relatively 
passive political actors which, rather than influencing concrete policy or public opinion, mostly 
engage in ‘constructing ideological fellowship’ (Denham & Garnett, 1998) to assure elites of 
the validity of their views and to provide legitimising discourses for political elites’ already 
existing policy preferences. Others propose that think tanks are influential mostly at certain 
junctures, in particular crisis moments. The example of think tank activity during the crisis of 
neo-liberalism was already discussed in the previous section. Another example is that think 
tanks have been found influential when political parties have suffered repeated electoral 
setbacks and choose new leaders who seek to radically overhaul party structure and ideology. 
Here, research on Britain and Germany has shown how think tanks helped political leaders to 
circumvent internal opponents or institutional barriers by providing a modernising discourse 
from outside the party (Pautz, 2012).The broader institutionalist literature (e.g. Schmidt, 2008; 
Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) has informed such a take on think tanks and their influence in its 
consideration of the role of crisis in policy change and of the role of ideas and discourse.  
Much of the think tank literature suggests that think tanks are relevant ‘upstream’ in the policy 
process, i.e. not so much when it comes to policy implementation or evaluation but rather when 
it comes to problem framing and promoting certain policy solutions or broader policy 
discourses over others. This is where agenda-setting frameworks may help to understand the 
role of think tanks in the policy-making process. One example for such a framework is John 
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Kingdon’s multiple streams framework. The framework was originally developed for a US-
American context and to address the question ‘why some subjects become prominent on the 
policy agenda and others do not, and why some alternatives for choice are seriously considered 
while others are neglected’ (Kingdon, 1984, 3). Kingdon proposed that the agenda-setting 
process consists of three conceptually separate ‘streams’ of ‘problems’, ‘policies’ and 
‘politics’. These three streams must be ‘coupled’ to allow for a policy idea to have impact on 
the governmental agenda. This coupling occurs during fleeting moments of opportunity, called 
‘policy windows’ (Kingdon, 1984, 21). Ideas play a core role in this framework, but also the 
realisation that ideas require actors which develop them into policy solutions and promote them 
as such. Therefore, think tanks can be usefully placed into the multiple streams framework as 
what Kingdon calls ‘policy entrepreneurs’.  As such, think tanks frame certain issues as 
problems in the problem stream and, in the policy stream, selectively use the available research 
to present, to time-pressed decision-makers, comparatively easily digestible advice for ‘fixes’ 
of policy problems. Think tanks are also well-placed in the politics stream as they are integrated 
in policy networks which allow them to communicate with decision-makers and because they 
have the skills to sense whether what Kingdon refers to as the ‘national mood’ is right to further 
push a policy idea onto the governmental agenda. In short, think tanks are amongst those policy 
actors who recognise a ‘policy window’ as an opportunity for policy change. This is even more 
so the case when think tanks and decision-makers already share wider beliefs and persuasions, 
as the attention that government dedicates to problems ‘relates more to the beliefs of 
policymakers, and persuasion strategies of influencers, than the size of the problem or evidence 
base for its solution’ (Cairney, 2018, 203). While the framework was developed for a US-
context, Herweg et al (2015) propose that it is suitable also for agenda-setting analysis in 
parliamentary systems for as long as party leaders, party ‘in-house’ experts, and interest groups 
are considered as central policy entrepreneurs.  
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However, there is one possible caveat to be considered here. Given that policy change often 
takes a long time as existing policies and policy preferences among key policy field 
stakeholders have to be ‘softened up’, it is worth considering whether think tanks are adept at 
pursuing the required long-term approach. After all, think tanks may not have the resources to 
undertake agenda-setting activities for extended periods. But then there is an increasing need 
amongst decision-makers for ‘fast policy’ as in ‘an increasingly connected, globalised and 
temporally compressed social world, policymaking has become “speeded up”’ (Lewis & 
Hogan, 2019, 1). Think tanks should be well-placed to benefit from this trend and therefore be 
able to contribute to agenda-setting.  
 
Think Tanks and the Media 
The connections between think tanks and the news media are also important to understand 
think tanks’ role as agenda-setters . Arguing that ‘the practice of think tankery is above all 
about the mediation of ideas’, Schlesinger proposes to see think tank staffers as ‘media 
intellectuals’ and adds that they often have a news media background (Schlesinger, 2009, 3). 
Unfortunately, there is so still too little systematic analysis of the relationship between think 
tanks and the media and of its role for policy-making. Existing research, however, seems to 
indicate that it is one of symbiosis: think tanks are useful sources for journalists wanting to 
source information or simply an opinion piece, while think tanks use the media in the hope of 
influencing the ‘climate of opinion’ (Denham & Garnett, 1998).  This symbiosis thrives on 
think tanks’ crucial reputational capital of autonomy and independence. Whereas, for example, 
professional organisations, trade unions or business umbrella groups are viewed to have a 
vested self-interest in certain policy issues, think tanks are generally not, as discussed earlier 
(Rich, 2005). This is important for the authority of their representatives when they come on 
radio or TV or contribute to a blog or a newspaper article. Whether or not they are introduced 
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with regards to their political orientation or financial dependencies – and often they are not – 
think tanks are usually presented to their audience as objective and impartial organisations 
seeking to improve an irrational and partisan political debate with evidence and expertise 
(Heins & Pautz, 2016). The same is true when think tank staff write opinion pieces for 
newspaper and news magazines. In Denmark, research has shown  liberal newspapers to give 
more coverage to think tanks close to their own mindset, while centre-left newspapers allocate 
more space to think tanks with a social democratic bend. In newspapers of both political 
tendencies think tanks were presented as independent expert organisations – think tanks were, 
therefore, ‘successful in  casting  themselves  in  the  news  media  as  expert  sources  rather  
than being affiliated with specific political interests’ (Blach-Ørsten & Nørgaard Kristensen, 
2016, 40). In his study of the Heritage Foundation, a high-profile conservative US-American 
think tank, Haas found that the news media uncritically presented the think tank’s output as if 
it were scientific even though scholarly research had not been conducted to underpin it (Haas, 
2004). Similarly, in an extensive study of the media representation of seven think tanks, Haas 
found that think tanks, regardless of whether they were advocacy-oriented or not, were 
presented by the media as credible sources in almost all cases. This occurred whether or not 
professional norms of academic research were followed (Haas, 2007). A further problem seems 
to be that the frequency of appearances of think tanks in the news media is related to their 
financial resources. As Rich and Weaver (2000) established, for the US and nearly 20 years 
ago, disparities in the budgets of think tanks account for substantial variation in their media 
visibility. Lauren McDonald (2013) found that it was conservative think tanks – better staffed 
than their centrist or leftist counterparts – which have gained a position within the US-
American media landscape from which they could dominate media discourse on education 
policy. Related to the stronger presence of conservative think tanks in the news media, 
McKnight found that in Britain no think tank from the left or the political centre has any kind 
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of relationship to either Rupert Murdoch or his global news media empire – a very different 
situations compared to think tanks identified as belonging to the right of the political spectrum 
(McKnight 2010).  
While think tanks generally are said to seek media presence as an important ingredient of their 
ability to influence policy and public debate (Dahl Kelstrup, 2015), only empirical case studies 
can show whether think tanks have had significant influence on media reporting on specific 
issues. For example, Lalueza and Girona found no impact of Spanish think tanks on how the 
mass media spoke about the economic crisis during 2013 and 2014 (Lalueza & Girona, 2016).  
Here, at least briefly, the issue of ‘false balance’ in media reporting should be mentioned.  In 
attempts by public broadcasters to produce balanced news reporting, journalists have been 
criticised for giving all expert views the same amount of ‘airspace’ - irrespective of whether 
some of these views are considered to be false or unacceptable by the majority of experts (e.g. 
Nuccitelli, 2014). Some think tanks have benefitted from this as,despite clear affiliations to, 
and dependencies on, special interests, they have been allowed to speak as authoritative voices 
on matters such as alcohol minimum pricing, tobacco use and advertisement, and climate 
change, thus acting as ‘merchants of doubt’ (Cann & Raymond, 2018; Miller & Dinan, 2015). 
The discussion about the nature and causes of climate change is a particularly well-documented 
example. Over the years, the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) has frequently invited 
Nigel Lawson, former Member of Parliament and co-founder of the UK-based think tank 
‘Global Warming Policy Foundation’, to broadcasts about climate change. Being interviewed 
besides climate change experts from established and recognised research organisations, the 
non-scientist Lawson was able to promote views about anthropogenic climate change which 
are deemed scientifically false by the climate change ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1989). 
This meant that the think tank has successfully conducted ‘boundary work’ as it moved the line 
demarcating who can speak as an ‘expert’ and whose statements are perceived as credible 
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knowledge. Some claim, still with regards to climate change but in a US-American context, 
that the ways in which media treat think tanks as credible sources of objective information 
means that they have achieved the status of an ‘alternate academia’ while falling short of 
academic standards of rigour, transparency and impartiality (Dunlap & Jacques 2013, 701). 
This throws a spotlight on the problematic role of think tank experts in the policy process.  
 
Epistemic Crisis and Other Challenges  
Hernando et al have suggested (2018) that think tanks have had to face three major challenges 
since the late 2000s: financial constraints in a world characterised by austerity; increased 
competition both among think tanks and with other policy research organisations; and a 
growing questioning of, and popular dissatisfaction with, the role of the ‘expert’ itself. These 
challenges are likely to persist and will influence if and how think tanks remain meaningful 
policy actors, so that it is worth looking at them in turn. 
First, as the policy analysis and advice industry has expanded, funding sources have not 
necessarily grown in tandem. Anecdotal accounts from think tank insiders suggest that a decade 
of austerity has brought about ‘leaner times for think tanks’ (Hernando et al, 2018, 136) as 
government agencies have less funding available to support external research and as private 
funding has decreased. Furthermore, even at the best of times, think tank funding is often for 
short-term projects and therefore think tanks need to invest significant resources into 
institutional survival through a diverse set of fundraising activities. Second, there is strong 
competition in the world of policy expertise as many universities, NGOs, business umbrella 
groups, or large banks have established their own applied policy research centres. Sometimes 
these also work closely with think tanks for reasons of legitimacy and for demonstrating 
objectivity. The third major challenge is that of an ‘epistemic crisis’. With advanced 
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information and communication technology, ‘Big Data’, and citizen science has come 
‘information overload’ (Bawden & Robinson, 2009). While policy-makers generally consider 
‘more and ‘better’ information to lead to ‘better’ policy, information overload has led to 
selection and prioritisation problems. In this context, the ‘problem of extension’ could be 
discussed, too. It describes the dissolution of the ‘boundary between experts and the public’ 
(Collins & Evans, 2002, 235) which has seen the rise of ‘experience-based experts’ (Collins & 
Evans, 2002, 238) and also renewed discussions over the legitimacy of including or excluding 
people from decision-making processes on the basis of ‘possessing’ the  relevant authoritative 
expertise. Furthermore, ‘information pollution’ (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017) in the form of 
low-quality information and deliberately disseminated misinformation has also contributed to 
the complexity of policy-makers’ and decision-makers’ task. Its most recent expression may 
lie in the rise of so-called ‘post-truth politics’ (e.g. Harsin, 2015) and should be seen in 
conjunction with the rise in ‘suspicion among citizens of key institutions of information 
generation’ (Doberstein, 2018, 364).  
It is easy to see how the consequences of these challenges can be highly problematic for all 
policy actors. In such an environment , policy-makers may be forced to develop policy ideas, 
make decisions and implement policy on the basis of an unprecedented abundance of 
conflicting, contested and contaminated information whilst being subjected to a ‘post-truth 
discourse’ which denies the legitimacy of established policy-makers and their institutions and 
therefore also rejects their policy agendas, analyses and solutions. Worryingly, in a context in 
which experts are discredited, policy-makers might not feel the need to seek external counsel 
or validation. This is a concern pronounced in the US-American context of Donald Trump’s 
‘post-factual’ presidency and one which led the Heritage Foundation think tank, in 2018, to 
ponder the possible ‘death’ of the think tank. This was prompted by the realisation 
comparatively few that think tank staffers were moved into government advisory position by a 
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president who has challenged the very idea of truth and facts (Heritage Foundation, 2018). 
Post-truth politics are not a monopoly held by the US. During the 2016 campaign over the 
United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, a senior government minister and key 
proponent of ‘Brexit’ claimed that ‘people had enough of experts’ (Gove, 2016) – a claim 
perceived by many as representative of a wider epistemic crisis in Britain.  
While the epistemic crisis has made the relationship between expertise and policy-making more 
complicated, think tanks may still profit from it. Potentially, think tanks could transform into 
significant standard-setters, filters or arbiters of quality in policy analysis, as with information 
overload and pollution comes a need for editors and curators who can help discern the 
reliability and usefulness of analytic products (Hernando et al 2018). However, as other 
research has shown, there could be a problem as to think tanks’ credibility and also with regards 
to the (perception of the) quality – or, rather, the lack of it - of their output on the side of 
government policy analysts (e.g. Ceccarelli, 2011; Jacques, 2008).  
 
Conclusion  
The  think tank, as discussed, is one contributor among many to the policy-making process. Its 
specific contribution to policy-making is that of policy expertise tailored to the needs of time-
pressed decision-makers. Despite of what appears as the increasing devaluation of expertise in 
public discourse, policy-making is hardly possible and certainly not desirable without it. 
However, think tanks are not necessarily contributing to ‘better policy’, as was discussed with 
regards to some think tanks’ dubious role in highly contentious policy areas. Also, despite 
protestations of objectivity and a focus on ‘evidence’, it is clear that think tank output and 
activity are necessarily and inevitably influenced by the ideational prisms of those who work 
for the think tank and who fund it. This is, of course, the case for any research. In that sense, 
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the chapter tried to cast a critical spotlight on the think tank, not to dismiss it as an illegitimate 
or problematic actor in the policy process but rather to assure that those interested in the 
relationship between ideas, expertise and policy-making and how it is manifest in the think 
tank can use this chapter as a starting point for their own critical enquiry.  
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